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Transatlantic divisions
Exactly 40 years ago, President John F. Kennedy -  while visiting Frankfurt -  sug- 
gested that ties between the United States and Europę were so close and so essen- 
tial that both sides should consider not only economic cooperation, but possibly 
even a political union between these two pillars of the West. He said that “we -  
Americans -  do not regard a strong and united Europę as a rival but as a partner.” 
He even proposed that a declaration of interdependence be made between what he 
described as “the new union emerging in Europę and the old American union”2.
That idea did not materialize. Today, in the mid-2003, the situation is very 
different. Nobody talks about a transatlantic union -  many people talk rather about 
the transatlantic rift. But what are the actual relations between Europę and America? -  
There is much disagreement on that matter.
Some people believe that relationships between Europę and America are in 
deep crisis and both sides are moving towards a major clash. Others -  on the 
contrary -  believe that what is really true about mutual relations between the Uni­
ted States and the European Union today is the unprecedented degree of economic 
integration and numerous examples of good political co-operation -  moreover, they 
believe that the existing tensions are temporary and will be amended shortly without 
any problems.
The first group -  let us cali them the pessimists -  list a growing number of 
disagreements between both sides: How to deal with the Middle East affairs (Pal- 
estinian-Israeli relations; policies toward Iraq, Iran and Turkey); The Bush admini- 
stration refusal to participate in intemational agreements (Kyoto Protocol on global 
warming; verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Control Treaty and
1 Paper delivered at the Transatlantic Forum of the [American] State Legislative Leaders Foundations, 
Kraków, July 2003.
2 M. W a lk e r , The European Problem , “National Review Online” 2003, June 10.
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; worldwide ban on anti-personal land mines; 
International Criminal Court); ąuarrels about subsidies to Steel and agricultural 
products and export of genetically modified foods.
Many European politicians criticize the Bush-introduced preemptive mili- 
tary actłon as a foreign policy doctrine. The White House, in turn, criticizes Euro­
pean unwillingness to increase defense spending or attempts to diminish the role of 
NATO by introducing European rapid deployment forces.
These ąuarrels on intemational issues are exacerbated by numerous dis- 
agreements over such traditionally domestic issues as food safety, the death pen- 
alty, data privacy and a rangę of other civil liberties. Then, the transatlantic pessi- 
mists mention the crisis caused by the “war against terror”, and the Iraąi war in 
particular.
Throughout the Cold War, Berlin Wall was known to divide the world. 
Russia and Eastern Europę posed a great danger to the Western civilization and 
Western Europę was the front line in the world’s fight against communism. There- 
fore, the American foreign policy was aimed to protect European stability as the 
key to stability and security of the US and of the world. That approach, however, 
has changed. Today, Americans believe they themselves are on the front line of 
major world threats, and the danger emanates from beyond Europę. As a conse- 
ąuence, Europę -  having already been secure -  is increasingly not seen by the US 
as a necessary partner in new global campaigns3. This became clearly visible in the 
developments following September 11 attack although first actions did not suggest 
the incoming problems. Right after the terrorist attack, the European NATO part- 
ners of the US decided to act along Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty4. That 
has happened for the first time in history of the organization. Moreover, members 
of the European Union manifested “total solidarity” with the US and helped to 
ensure swift and unanimous UN support for the United States. But much to 
Europę’s disappointment the White House seemed not to be much interested in the 
offered assistance. On January 29, 2002, in George W. Bush’s State of the Union 
address there was no mentioning of the role of NATO, the United Nations, and the 
European Union in countering terrorism. Thus, many Europeans felt downgraded 
to a secondary role in important world affairs5. The rift deepened when President 
Bush declared during the anti-terrorism summit in Warsaw that “a coalition partner 
must do more than just express sympathy, a coalition partner must perform... 
You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror”6. The Berliner Zei- 
tung wrote that “Never has a president of the United States been so foreign to us 
and never have German citizens been so skeptical about the policies of their most 
powerful of allies”.
3 D. S. H a m il to n ,  The 21" Century Reąuires a Global U.S.-European partnersliip, “European Affairs” 
2003, Spring.
4 Article V stipulates that an attack on any member country o f  NATO constitutes an attack on all coun­
tries. It places all Alliance members under an obligation to offer military support to the country under attack.
5 S. S e r f a ty ,  Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership, Center for Strategie and International Studies, 
Washington DC 2003, p. 5.
6 http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/! 1/06/gen.attack.on.terror.
Then came the Iraqi crisis -  it divided the European Union, NATO and the 
United Nations. Large parts of European public opinion were not convinced by the 
arguments of US Administration that the naturę of the Iraąi war is prevention. They 
questioned the reasons announced for that war, doubting the seriousness of the 
threat of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. They did not see that war 
as a legitimate and exerted pressure on their govemments not to participate in it. 
The NATO members: France and Germany (with the support of Russia) blocked 
the US-sponsored Security Council resolution on the issue. Transatlantic relations 
reached a bottom.
In analyzing European-American relations, the pessimists underline that 
there have been not only differences in the approach to particular issues but a gen­
erał divergence in perspectives. Robert Kagan -  in his well-known article “Power 
and Weakness” -  wrote that Europę is tuming away from exercising power: it is 
moving into a self-contained world of laws and rules, and transnational negotiation 
and cooperation7. The United States, meanwhile, continue to believe in power, in 
a world where intemational laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security 
and defense and promotion of liberał order still depend on the possession and use 
of military power. Many Americans believe that Europę is faint-hearted, soft- 
headed and has no or little military and political power8. At the same time they see 
the US as a mighty state -  moreover -  the country of morał clarity and resolute 
action. This is why, as far as major strategie and intemational ąuestions today go -  
at least in Kagan’s opinion -  Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from 
Venus: they have little to agree on, and less and less understanding for each other.
Pessimists also stress the growing economic competition across the Atlan­
tic and the inereasing role of Euro in the world, which both weaken the position of 
the United States. So, when they take into consideration all of reasons mentioned 
above, they are coming to a very dramatic conclusion that the end of the Western 
world is approaching (as Charles Kupchan recently wrote in the Atlantic M onthlyf. 
Kupchan forecasted that the next clash of civilizations will not be between the 
Western world and the outside but the United States will clash with Europę.
The other group -  let’s cali them the optimists -  analyzes the history of 
European-American relations as well as the current situation differently. In par­
ticular, they do not perceive today’s state of affairs as anything unusual. They say 
that outlooks on the two sides of the Atlantic, while often similar, have rarely been 
identical. They have been differences in the past; there will be differing views in 
the futurę. What is crucial though, is the unprecedented degree of economic inte- 
gration across the Atlantic. The two way trade is estimated now at 40 percent of 
total world trade10. In the 1990s, European direct investment in the United States 
grew from roughly $247 billion to almost $900 billion, while US investment in
7 R. K a g a n , Power and Weakness, "Policy Review”, June 2003.
8 J. S o la n a , Mars and Venus Reconciled: A New Era fo r  Transatlantic Relations-, lecture at Harvard 
University, April 7, 2003. http://sais-ihu.edu/centers/fpi/Solana harvard.
9 Ch. A. K u p c h a n , The End o f  the West, “The Atlantic Monthly” , November 2002.
10 J. P. Q u in la n ,  Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy o fth e  Transatlantic Economy, Cen­
ter for Transatlantic Relations, Washington DC 2003.
Europę rose from $215 billion to nearly $650 billion. For all the talk about the im- 
portance of NAFTA or the “Asian century”, over the past eight years, American 
investment in the tiny Netherlands alone was twice what it was in Mexico and 10 
times what it was in China. In turn, there is more European investment in Texas 
than there is American investment in Japan. Etc.
There is more between Europę and America than just close economic links. 
There is a political co-operation as well: to mention but the Balkans and Afghani- 
stan. Moreover, peoples on both sides of the Atlantic share the same approach to 
democratic govemance. There is also a dramatic convergence in societal attitudes 
and behavior. Shortly after World War II, Theodore White wrote: “The American 
traveler comes to a Europę which is more foreign to Americans today than it has 
ever been in all our history” 11. Now travelers who cross the ocean move from one 
family residence to another rather than from one civilization to another. The opti- 
mists believe that there is no opposition between power, “the US method”, and law, 
which is “the European method”. In fact, law and power can be two sides of the 
same coin12. Power is needed to establish law and law is the legitimate face of 
power. Sometimes European countries have tended to forget that law and intema­
tional standards have to rely on force. And occasionally Americans seem to have 
forgotten that, if it is to have a lasting effect, force needs to be backed by legiti- 
macy. Yet these problems can be ąuickly corrected. Those issues come together in 
the case of Iraq. Not everyone sees the war as legitimate. Therefore, many politi- 
cians have tried to make sure that peace is seen as legitimate. That is why the role 
of the UN in the political reconstruction is important. The United States seems to 
agree with that as time is passing by and with inereased problems faced in Iraq.
Summing up, the optimists do not perceive the current transatlantic rela­
tions as ones in crisis and are convinced about further developments of close, mu- 
tually beneficial, contacts between Europę and America in the futurę.
Old and New Europę
In January 2003, Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, for the first time 
used the now famous juxtaposition of the ‘Old Europę’, which balked at war in 
Iraq, versus the ‘New Europę’, which backed the fight for the good cause against 
Saddam, terror and the like13. The terms Old and New Europę have sińce then been 
widely adopted to distinguish the founding Western states of the European Union, 
particularly Germany and France, from the new members from the East, led by 
Poland. The division was furthered by the widespread belief in Western Europę 
that the newcomers are post-communist converts to American ideals. Some jour- 
nalists would go as far as suggesting that these countries may even want to estab-
11 T. H. W h ite , Fire in the Ashes: Europę in the Mid-Century, W illiam Sloane Associates, New York 
1953, p. 6-7. Quoted after S. S e r f a ty ,  Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership..., p. 15.
12 Ibidem.
13 R. F o ro o h a r ,  What New Europę, “Newsweek” 2003, June 23.
lish themselves as an entity resembling the 5 lst American state in the heart of the 
Continent.
The reality, however, is much different: links between “Old” and “New” 
parts of Europę are numerous and strong, while at the same time there is a lot of 
associations between Europę (as a whole, and as all parts of it) and the United 
States.
There is no separate entity in the East which can be called New Europę and 
is highly unlikely that one can emerge. The new EU members are a very diverse 
group with varying agendas14. There are relatively rich countries among them (Slo- 
venia), and poor ones (Latvia); large (Poland), and smali (Estonia). Poles are likely 
to join forces with France against the majority of EU countries to maintain the cur- 
rent system of agricultural subsidies. The President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaś­
niewski, is an EU admirer while the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus 
is Euro-skeptic. Estonians are aggressive free traders, while Poles and Slovaks are 
protectionists. So it goes. As far as such critical economic matters as key trans­
atlantic trade disputes, tax subsidies for exporters, and laws regarding genetically 
modified foods, are concemed New Europę is likely to vote hand in hand with Old 
Europę. Moreover, many East-Central European countries are suspicious of each 
other and unwilling to develop close ties between themselves, fearing possible 
domination of one country over another. For example, Czechs have never been 
ready to accept any formalization of the so-called Visegrad Group, being afraid that 
Poland’s domination in such an organization can diminish their chances in the EU.
Moreover, contrary to what is occasionally assumed -  Europę -  its individ- 
ual governments as well as their union -  generally acknowledges the primacy of 
US power and the need for US leadership, despite the fact that it would prefer the 
multi-power world and occasionally criticizes America. Europeans understand and 
appreciate the crucial role played by the United States in the revival of many of its 
nation-states after World War I, World War II, and after the Cold War. Most politi- 
cians in Europę also comprehend and fear the threats to security environment by 
the potential dissemination of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states or to 
terrorist groups, sharing American opinion on that. Europę also shares with the US 
many ideas about the futurę of the Middle East, differing with the US only in how 
to achieve certain goals.
Therefore, it would be a mistake for the US to continue to promote the di- 
visions between the Old and New Europę, resort to ‘cherry-picking’ from among 
its European allies15. To do so would ignore the fact that, collectively, the EU has 
capacities that its individual members lack. Historically, the US has continued to 
bring an enormous contribution to ending conflicts between European countries. 
It would be a mutual loss if people across the Atlantic were to start ąuarrelling 
again. Attempts to divide Europę only strengthen those who argue, misguidedly, 
that European identity lies in opposing the US. Instead Europeans should discuss 
stronger integration. It means they should talk more about Europę. But at the same
14 Ibidem.
15 J. S o la n a , Mars and Venus Reconciled...
time not less about America. In particular, Europeans should do more to reassure 
Americans that the union we are completing will continue to make the United 
States feel welcome in Europę -  ensure that what we do is not an attempt to chal­
lenge the United States.
On the other side, Americans should remember that the United States with- 
out the institutional links to Europę, provided by the Atlantic Alliance, and with the 
transatlantic partnership reduced just to a one-time limited coalitions with single 
European states, with no more than an occasional “mission” -  an idea floated by 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld -  can really mean an isolated America adrift 
in a hostile world -  a power without permanent allies16. To think about Europę 
without the EU -  as well as to think about the EU without NATO -  is to imagine 
the very kind of Europę that the United States has attempted to put an end to 
throughout the past 50 years: less safe because it would become increasingly di- 
vided and less and less predictable, closer to resurrecting its past than to entering 
the futurę, and infinitely more dangerous17.
The position of Poland: from nowhere back to Europę
The Middle Ages, with several exceptions, were a period of growth for Polish in­
fluence in Europę. In the 16th and 17th centuries, Poland was one of the largest and 
most powerful European kingdoms. The country was the crucial rampart of Chris- 
tianity, a defender of Europę against Turkish and other invaders. Later, the situa- 
tion changed dramatically. Poland was weakened by external wars and internal 
political struggle. Finally -  in 1795 -  it lost its independence. For over a hundred 
and twenty years, Poland was effaced from the maps of the world. Like a phoenix 
rising from its ashes, Poland regained its independence after the First World War. 
Not for long -  happiness lasted less than 20 years. Then came the Second World 
War. Poland was occupied again by Germany and Soviet Russia and suffered tre- 
mendous losses. Eventually, in spite of being on the winning side, the country was 
abandoned by its war allies and disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. Located in the 
communist Eastern Europę it was often perceived in the West rather as a part of the 
Soviet Union than a country of the West European civilization.
Polish geopolitical location started to shift again in the 1980s -  as cracks 
began to emerge in the communist system. Through the election of the Polish Pope, 
John Paul II, through Lech Wałęsa’s ‘Solidarity’ movement, the country started to 
lessen its ties with the East. Other East European countries followed the suit. 
Shortly after the 1989 revolution, the US Department of State issued a special di- 
rective to its employees -  reminding them not to use the misleading and prejudiced 
expression -  ‘Eastern Europę’. The region slowly became recognized again as 
a part of the Europę proper.
16 S. S e r f a ty ,  Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership..., p. 10.
17 Ibidem, p. 23.
The events of 1989-1990 transformed Europę. Once oppressed, states re- 
gained their independence and nations claimed back their identity. The astonishing 
scalę of changes in Central-Eastern Europę alone is best represented by the fact 
that the number of countries in this region almost doubled after the collapse of 
communism, their number rising from eleven to twenty-one. Until 1990, Poland 
had bordered three countries: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and the German 
Democratic Republic. At that time all the three disappeared from the map. A year 
later, without changing its borders, Poland already had seven neighbors: the united 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia -  now two separate states, Ukrainę, 
Belarus, Lithuania, and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. In the broader Euro­
pean perspective, people also began to try -  through the expansion of NATO and 
the European Union -  to mend the rift that for so long had kept the Continent split 
in two.
So where does Poland lie today? It lies in the center of Europę, and not 
only in the geographical aspect. Norman Davies, a famous British historian, titled 
his well known history of Poland: Heart o f Europę %. For him Poland is very much 
a part of Europę. It is a repository of typically European ideas and values.
Poles never had any doubts about their location in the world. They always 
felt themselves citizens of Europę and members of the European civilization. It is, 
therefore, only natural for them to be rejoined with countries of Western Europę. 
But this has proven difficult.
Joining NATO and the European Union
Right after 1989, everything looked easy. The old Warsaw Pact was dismantled, as 
well as the Comecon. But then problems began. On the one hand, a large number 
of people in the West -  particularly in the US -  had asked for a ‘peace dividend’ 
and called for dismantling of the NATO -  seeing it a relic of the Cold War -  a step 
Russia, too, demanded, never perceiving NATO as defense organization. On the 
other hand, Poland and other East European countries, still afraid of Russia, were 
very much interested in keeping the alliance alive and so applied to join NATO. 
Russia strongly opposed the move. For a while, the West was hesitant. As a delay- 
ing tactic, various ‘Partnership for Peace’-type-of initiatives were created. But the 
Bałkan crisis, which developed in the meantime, proved the need to maintain 
NATO. In 1999, after several years of negotiations, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary were admitted to the organization. Since then, these new members 
have successfully participated in numerous NATO activities. Polish soldiers now 
serve in NATO contingents in Bośnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Moreover, in 2003 
Adam Kobieracki became NATO Deputy Secretary General.
Parallel to these developments, at the beginning of the 1990s, all former 
East European countries expressed their willingness to join the European Union.
18 N. D a v ie s , Heart o f  Europę. A Short History o f  Poland, Oxford 1984.
In generał, this reąuest received positive response from the West. Yet when actual 
negotiations started, Western leaders, always keeping one eye on their domestic 
approval ratings, preferred to support the demands of their constituencies, often 
contrary to vital pan-European interests. In the last decade, Europę would find it- 
self lacking visionary politicians, such as Winston Churchill, who talked about the 
‘United States’ of Europę as early as 1945 -  or, for that matter, Charles de Gaulle 
and Conrad Adenauer, who managed to overcome the legacy of the Second World 
War and reestablish friendly relations between former foes. Therefore, without 
political encouragement, negotiations to admit new members were often stacked 
for a long time over discussions about very detailed issues.
When at the Seville Summit in June 2002, the EU finally agreed to bring in 
10 new states by the end of 2004, there was little celebration. Timothy Garton Ash 
called it the ‘grim wedding’. On June 27 he wrote in the Guardian: “Imagine 
a wedding party delayed for 15 years by the meanness and prevarication of the 
bridegroom. Who would have any pleasure in it when it finally came? Such now is 
the reunification of Europę: the wedding of the western and eastern parts of the 
continent divided for decades by the walls and barbed wire of the Cold War. Even 
the name for the party has become a bore. No longer the reunification or, as we 
also used to say, the healing of Europę, it is just ‘EU enlargement’” What went 
wrong? “We did -  Ash continued -  We, the Western Europeans. For a start, many 
Western Europeans never really thought of those ‘faraway countries of which we 
know little’ as part of Europę anyway. Others, notably France, did not want these 
countries to join our French-led, rich man’s club at all... Anti-immigrant populists 
from Haider to Le Pen inereased the domestic opposition... Then Helmut Kohl and 
Francois Mitterrand decided that Western Europę had first to make its own mone- 
tary union.” So it goes.
Once the EU leaders made political decisions concerning enlargement, an­
other ąuestion, namely, who should pay for this, immediately sprang up. The net 
contributors to the EU budget, and especially Germany, worrying about a possible 
new recession, do not want to pay more; at the same time the net benefactors pro­
test against any projects that could curtail their former subsidies. As a result, the 
net sum that the EU proposes to transfer to its ten new members over the first three 
years after enlargement, from 2004 to 2006, has been set at about € 25 billion. Is it 
much? One can compare this both to the Marshall Plan, under which the US trans- 
ferred the equivalent of € 97 billion (at today’s prices) to Western Europę from 
1948 to 1951, and to the unification of Germany in the 1990s, when West Germany 
transferred about € 600 billion to East Germany. “So much for the great solidarity 
of Europeans with Europeans” -  wrote Ash.
Despite problems, negotiations nevertheless continued. In the end of 2002 
Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller won the risky gambie to obtain advantageous 
concessions in the finał stage of negotiations with the EU. His politics infuriated 
some while taking others by surprise. The dramatic negotiations in Copenhagen at 
the end of the EU expansion talks on December 13 confirmed the opinion about 
Poland being the new tough member the EU will have to deal with in the futurę.
* * *
Poland was greatly successful in the 1990s: democratization of the country, rapid 
economic transformation, and freedom -  and at the same time, paradoxically, 
growing frustration with the European Union. Poles expected to be welcomed as 
long-awaited brothers and granted special privileges for their achievements with 
fighting the communism. Instead, they were greeted with arduous negotiations. 
Romantic enthusiasm clashed with tough politics and cold calculations -  a case 
entirely different than NATO accession, where the dominating language was close 
to Polish hearts: the language of shared values, fight for freedom and democracy 
against dictatorial regimes, terrorists, etc.19 Thus, NATO often became the personi- 
fication of Polish nostalgia for the West. And it was mainly thanks to the US that 
Poland could join the organization.
Poland entering world’s politics. Is it the American Trojan horse in Europę?
Shortly after the EU Copenhagen Summit, the Polish government awarded the 
contract to supply fighter aircraft for the Polish army to the American Lockheed 
Martin Corporation. Lockheed’s F16s won a tough contest with their European 
competitors. The several billion dollar deal was, of course, welcomed in America 
but irritated the defeated European partners: France in particular. The US offer was 
clearly the best, and European ones could simply be no match for it. Nevertheless, 
Poles were accused of making a purely political decision with no economic justifi- 
cation, of violating European solidarity, of striking a blow to the interests of the 
European military industry, of impairing credibility of Poland as futurę EU mem- 
ber, and of embarking upon a road of subjugation by the US. Some media began to 
talk about Poland playing the role of the American Trojan horse in the emerging 
new Europę. Tensions between Poland and some of its EU partners grew consid- 
erably.
Then the Iraqi crisis deve!oped
In March 2003, as the political strife in the Security Council between the US and 
the French-German-Russian anti-intervention alliance was entering its finał phase, 
Poland -  along with seven other European countries -  sent a letter to President 
Bush supporting his policies towards Iraq. The letter was signed by British, Italian, 
Spanish, Portuguese, Danish, Czech, and Hungarian prime ministers as well, but 
France and Germany decided to single out Poland for criticism. They were infu-
19 Stary kontynent i nowe kłopoty, interview with Aleksander Smolar, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2003, March 1-2.
riated by the fact that a country so dependent on their support for EU admission, 
decided not to follow in their footsteps but instead proclaimed its own independent, 
pro-American foreign policy. Several media commentators in France and Germany 
labeled Poland again as the American Trojan horse in Europę, a country suppose- 
dly bought by the US to advance the White House interests in Europę20. French 
politicians ąuickly followed suit. Jacąues Chirac undiplomatically criticized Po­
land, saying that in serious debates, as a newcomer to world politics, it should keep 
quiet21. The German Suddeutsche Zeitung described Poland in even more derogato- 
ry terms as a ‘Trojan donkey’22.
Poland, however, decided to stay on the course and sent its soldiers to Iraq. 
In result, throughout the war, White House politicians -  President Bush in particu­
lar -  often praised Polish participation in the ‘coalition of the willing’.
By the way, recent Polish-American cooperation with respect to Iraąi af­
fairs was not without precedent. When in 1990 Saddam Hussein unexpectedly at- 
tacked Kuwait, American CIA operatives in Iraq were caught by surprise and failed 
to evacuate to safety on time. Their lives were at tremendous risk. Washington 
asked all its traditional Western allies for help, but received little assistance. In 
desperation, the Americans tumed to Poland. That was not an obvious move at that 
time -  the communist system had merely started to come apart; Poles already had 
‘their’ Prime Minister, but the President of the country as well as crucial Ministers 
of Intemal Security and Defense were still Russian-educated communists. Never- 
theless, the Polish intelligence apparatus decided to help the Americans. With Pol­
ish passports in hand and together with Polish construction workers, CIA agents 
were smuggled out of Iraq. Following that, Poland supplied Americans with de- 
tailed maps of Baghdad, once designed by Polish cartographers on Iraqi request, 
thus helping to plan actions during the 1991 operation Desert Storm. America be­
gan to trust Poles. Former communist heads of Polish security agencies received 
high American honors and Washington decided to sign off 50 percent of the Polish 
debt incurred under the communist rule.
Retuming to 2003 affairs. When Poland joined forces with the US, criti- 
cism of Poland retumed in European media. Frankfurter Rundschau wrote that 
Poles became ‘Uncle Sam’s mercenaries’ while Tageszeitung labeled Poles as 
‘American hirelings’21. It was, of course, not true at all. Poland decided to partici- 
pate in the war in Iraq not because of its own marginal role in the war with terror- 
ism, but because it would increase its standing in the European Union and in the 
region. Without judging the Washington policies towards Iraq, I believe that in the 
current circumstances the decision of the Polish government was right -  despite the 
fact that the majority of Poles opposed American intervention. British newspapers, 
such as The Times (May 21) and The Guardian (May 15), rightly compared Polish
20 O f interest can be the fact that in 1963 the President o f France, Charles de Gaulle, accused Britain of 
being America’s Trojan horse in Europę and vetoed Britain’s bid for admission to the European Common Market. 
Now the stable has different horses.
21 „Gazeta W yborcza” 2003, February 18.
22 B. M a je w s k i , Jak nas piszą, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 2003, June 17.
23 Ibidem.
policy towards the US to those of Tony Blair: acceptance of a leading, but not 
dominant role of the US in the world, convergence of values and interests and 
a readiness to cooperate, which -  however -  does stop short of subordination.
When the Iraqi campaign was over, Americans charged Poland with the 
task of running one of the four administrative zones in Iraq. It was decided that 
General Andrzej Tyszkiewicz would command an international division of stabili- 
zation forces in that zone. Also, professor Marek Belka, the former Polish Minister 
of Finance, was appointed deputy head of the American-run Office of Reconstruc- 
tion and Humanitarian Assistance and the Chairman of the Council for Interna­
tional Cooperation for the Reconstruction of Iraq. These have been important tasks. 
These appointments, however, were received with contempt in Germany and 
France. It was seen as confirmation that Poland’s position in the international 
community was indeed growing. When the Polish Minister of Defense asked his 
German counterpart to provide soldiers for the international division in Iraq under 
Polish command, the German Minister was unable to conceal his disappointment 
that Poles had the nerve to propose such a deal.
These reactions confirmed again one of the deceits of EU enlargement, 
namely, that Poles and other Central Europeans would be treated as equal part- 
ners24. The truth is that Germany and France have not been unanimous supporters 
of Polish accession to the EU and NATO: Russian sensibilities in particular were 
usually awarded priority. Moreover, it was assumed that, in an enlarged European 
Union, Poles and other new members would always pursue a policy of gratitude to 
their Western partners. Yet it soon became apparent that new members decided to 
look rather to the US for support. East European countries became aware of the 
fact that they could not always count on Germany and France, especially in times 
when these countries economic and political power weakened. In turn, Washington 
opted for awarding Poland a special status in recognition of the new geopolitical 
situation in Europę. The crucial strategie problems of the Continent during the 
coming decade will be connected to the status of Ukrainę and Belarus, left outside 
the new EU frontiers. Here, the wise Polish foreign policy tries to puli these coun­
tries westwards, to the benefit of all. The US understands the importance of that 
move and encourages Polish endeavors.
To stress Poland’s new role on the international arena even further, Presi­
dent George W. Bush decided to visit Poland during his lat, the 2003 European 
tour. In Kraków’s Wawel Royal Castle, the President delivered a significant speech 
to America’s European partners. He also applauded Polish participation in the bat- 
tles of Afghanistan and Iraq. “America will never forget -  said Bush -  that Poland 
rose at the moment. Again you have lived out of the words of the Polish motto: ‘for 
your freedom and ours” ’25.
24 R. B o y  es, Poles w axas Germans wane in new Europę, “The Times” 2003, May 19.
25 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/.
In  Europę, with America
Being in Europę, feeling European and strongly supporting European integration, 
Poles are at the same time very much in favor of maintaining close ties with the 
US. There is a history of friendly mutual relations between the two countries and 
its peoples. Every Pole is proud of Polish national heroes: generals Tadeusz Kości­
uszko and Kazimierz Pułaski who also fought for American independence. Poles 
remember well that Poland regained its statehood in 1918, owing this fact, to 
a great extent, to the politics of President Woodrow Wilson. Nor do they forget the 
support given by President Ronald Reagan and the American people to the ‘Soli- 
darity’ movement. Moreover, according to the last census, in the US there are over 
9 million people with Polish roots, a crucial link connecting both states. The United 
States have remained the very attractive country for Poles. Where, in post- 
communist Poland, does one find people waiting in the longest lines? In front of 
American consular offices. Thousands of Poles are eager to go to the US (some
150.000 a year lately). Poles, therefore, see no point in West European attempts to 
construct a Europę which would seek to keep the US, its traditional ally, out, at the 
same time promoting Russia, its former enemy, to become a close partner. They 
remember well that NATO was established 50 years ago for different reasons: to 
keep the expansionist Russia out, the detached America engaged, and Germany 
subdued26. This was the goal that secured the longest period with no wars on the 
Continent. Therefore, Poles see no contradiction in embracing both sides of the 
Atlantic. They fully agree with what President George W. Bush said recently, that 
“Poland is good Citizen of Europę and Poland is a close friend of America and 
there is no conflict between the two”27.
Being as much pro-European as pro-American, Poles are at the same real- 
istic about intemational relationships, knowing only too well that Poland is sup- 
ported by others not for altruistic reasons but because of their particular interests in 
certain situations. Poles remember that Europę abandoned Poland several times. 
They also remember that the democratic United States (as well as Great Britain) 
signed the shameful Yalta treaty which, in 1945, sold the country for 50 years of 
enslavement to the Soviet Union. This is why, today, Poles try to pursue multilat- 
eral politics -  their best security for the futurę.
In the case of the Polish-European-American-Iraqi issue, as time was going 
by, all forces of the crisis in the transatlantic camp decided to mend fences. In par­
ticular, the meeting of Polish, French and German Presidents in Wrocław in May 
2003, during the summit of Weimar Triangle countries, calmed down bilateral 
tensions. The media followed the change of the mood of Western politicians. 
Commentators began to stress Poland’s right to its own independent policies and 
the importance of Poland’s involvement in world politics. Handelsblad wrote on
26 S. S e r f a ty ,  Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership..., p. 8.
27 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003.05.
May 16, that Europeans have to accept the situation where ‘Poland joins the club of 
world’s powers’.
On April 17, 2003, Prime Minister Leszek Miller signed the EU accession 
treaty in Athens. In a national referendum held on June 8, almost 80 percent of 
Poles voted for integration with Europę. On May 1, 2004 Poland became the fuli 
member of the European Union. And will continue to be a close ally of the US.
There is a broad agreement that there is hardly any problem in the world 
that cannot be solved, or at least managed, if and when the United States and the 
EU are in agreement -  an argument for an ever-closer cooperation between the two 
“unions” -  the United States and the European Union -  the two that together form 
the community known as the West28. Javier Solana, the European Union High Rep- 
resentative, said recently: “It was only in the arms of Venus that Mars found peace. 
And was their beautiful daughter not the goddess Harmonia?”29
21 S. S e r fa ty ,  Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership..., p. 23.
29 J. S o la n a , Mars and Venus Reconciled...
